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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0397
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/Joint STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/Joint STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFIS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2566
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2717
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5979
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1388

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002342

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958 N/A

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR RO AF
SUBJECT: PRT/QALAT Q ROMANIAN INTEREST IN PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH
CAUTION

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1.Q(SBU) During a recent UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) training program on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Romanian representatives, all from the Ministry of Defense, privately expressed their strong interest in taking over the US PRT in Qalat, given Romanian troop experience in the area. They acknowledged, however, that the Romanian MFA and other civilian agencies remain to be convinced about the wisdom of Romania leading a PRT. They noted limitations and caveats that constrain a possible Romanian contribution (below).

¶2. (SBU) We are not sure this idea has any traction in Bucharest. We would like to suggest, however, that the Department consider the idea in Washington and inform Embassy Bucharest of USG views, so that if it arises the Embassy can respond appropriately.

¶3. (SBU) On May 5, the Romanian preliminary survey team provided the Regional Command Q South (RC-S) PRT officer an outline of their plans for the deployment of Romanian troops to the RC and to Zabul Province in July. The two Romanian deployments will be set up as separate entities, and troops and equipment will not be transferred between them. The contingent assigned to the RC Headquarters at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) will have slightly less capacity than the Romanian contingent currently there, which contributes to base security. In

particular, they will not have enough troops at KAF to be able to man the various watch stations and also patrol outside the base due to a national caveat on how many men are the minimum for a patrol. The shortfall will have to be made up by another nation. In Zabul, the Romanians will cover the central part of the province, but will not be able to cover all of the Forward Operating Bases due to a shortage of personnel (the Romanian team plans to ask their headquarters for an additional platoon to eliminate this shortfall). The Romanian team outlined areas in which the Romanian forces will need assistance from other nations. These include: logistics (air transportation, as well as supply trucking), classified communications and medical evacuation. The task force will also not have personnel to cover Civil-Military Affairs, Information Operations and certain intelligence functions. The Romanians will also not bring a political advisor (POLAD). In summary, the Romanians are very dedicated to their mission here, but resource limitations mean they will be seeking assistance at NATO HQs and from several nations on a bilateral basis.

¶4. (SBU) This approach could have important implications if they take over the PRT. Certainly we would welcome an opportunity to relieve the US military presence in Qalat and replace it with Romanian forces. We must ensure, however, that we maintain the performance of the PRT during and after the transition. Qalat PRT is responsible for Zabol province, one of four critical southern provinces. Should we, nevertheless, decide on a handover, we would recommend that we maintain a small

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State/AID/DOD civil-military affairs contingent with some force protection and access to CommanderQs Emergency Response Program (CERP) and AID Quick Impact Program (QIP) funding. If we rely only on Romanian planning and assets, we may miss opportunities to improve the situation there at a crucial time.

NEUMANN